

The Sun.

MONDAY, MARCH 21, 1887.

Woman Suffrage in Kansas.

The municipal elections which are to be held in Kansas next month will be of more than usual interest, because for the first time women will be allowed to vote at them. So far the indications are that only a small minority of the women entitled to vote will exercise the privilege. The time for registration is near its close, and yet, despite the concerted efforts of woman suffragists and of prohibitionists, less than 600 women have registered in Leavenworth out of a total population which was nearly 17,000 in 1880, and 500 in Topeka, a town which last year of about the same population. Up to the 11th of this month only about 80 women had registered in Atchison, whose population was more than 15,000 in 1880, and yet there the woman suffragists have been particularly ardent in their appeals to their sisters to come forward to exercise their new privilege.

In Junction City and in Dodge City, smaller towns, more interest in the elections is displayed by the women entitled to vote, and yet in the first place, out of 400 registered voters on March 9, only 64 were women to 335 men; but it is hoped that by the time of the close of registration something like one-third of the qualified women voters will be down on the lists. The report from Dodge City is more favorable as respects the proportionate number of women who will probably vote, and a despatch from Concordia expresses the opinion that the women will vote generally as the men, but the outlook at Leavenworth is thus far not very promising.

We observe that the strongest desire to vote is exhibited by the colored women. Out of 550 women registered in Leavenworth up to March 13, 75 were colored, and of the 500 registered in Topeka "a great many" are described as colored. The German women are said to be the "slowest of all" in manifesting any interest in the subject, and four-fifths of all the registered women are spoken of as among the less refined of their sex.

It is manifest, therefore, that in Kansas, as in the other States, the great mass of women are indifferent to the subject, and that the higher tier of intelligence are cultivating the more ardent they are to go to the polls.

A Striking Opinion.

Our esteemed contemporary, the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, thus diagnoses the present situation of politics:

"The general election outside New York and Tammany Hall is that with Mr. Cleveland for his candidate the Democrats could not be successful in New York, but neither could they be defeated by an annihilating majority."

We are bound to say, at the same time, that within a few days one of the wisest, most experienced, most important, and most impartial of Democratic politicians, in no way associated or connected with Tammany Hall or with the *Sun*, expressed to us the opinion that if Mr. Cleveland should be the next Democratic candidate, history has not recorded a defeat in a Presidential canvass equal to that which would await him.

There are all sorts of opinions about Mr. Cleveland, as there are about most other subjects, but this that we have reported comes from a source of much more than ordinary value, and we lay it before the public for philosophic consideration.

Inefficient Artillerists.

The dangers to which our seaboard cities are exposed through the lack of adequate defenses are now well known. A coast line four thousand miles long, excluding Alaska, is open to attack, while the richest ports most invite, because they offer the greatest depth of water for the approach of heavy warships. Since 1875 not a dollar has been appropriated toward constructing new defenses, and for two years not a dollar devoted to the care and repair of existing works. It will be impossible to man these, prove, and mount the first 16-inch gun before the year 1891, and meanwhile property amounting to billions of dollars is exposed to easy capture and destruction.

But in the *Journal of the Military Service Institution* Prof. PETER S. MICHIE sounds an alarm on a new branch of this subject, the utter inefficiency of the personnel of our coast defense. He declares that the artillery arm "has steadily deteriorated since the close of the civil war," is to-day the part of the army least competent for discharging the duties expected of it, is "inactive, inefficient, and wholly unskilled in the use of the modern armament."

"With officers unskilled, gun detachments untrained and weak garrisons at a few points on the coast and none on the frontier, the fate of Alexandria will be ours at every point attacked by an enemy unless the present state of affairs be first radically changed, and the development of a new and vigorous line be provided for."

The artillery consists of five regiments, each containing ten heavy and two light batteries, the former designed for service in permanent works, and the latter in the field with troops. The aggregate strength is 280 officers and 2,650 men, or only about one-tenth of the entire military peace establishment. The heavy battery has by law a maximum strength of only four officers and forty men, so that the entire coast defense, to say nothing of the lake forts, is entrusted to a force of 230 officers and 2,600 men. As a consequence, the harbor forts are often found in possession of a single battery. In no case, they can boast as much, while a fort on the Canadian lake frontier will perhaps be entrusted to infantry, though this latter arrangement is of less account when, as in the case of Fort Wayne, we find the principal armament of the works consisting of light field pieces, parked inside out of harm's way.

Since war operations against the Indians are conducted by the cavalry and infantry, and the artillery has no heavy modern guns to practise with, it can be readily understood why Prof. MICHIE considers that stagnation has fallen upon this arm. He holds that the chief difficulty consists in the organization. The battery or company is the unit, and the consequence of the scattering of commands. The Colonel personally commands more than five heavy batteries, and the Colonel of the Second Artillery only two out of his ten:

"Now a Colonel can establish the standard of drill, discipline, and efficiency of his regiment, only when he personally commands it as a unit. He can neither control nor permanently influence these elements in the detached batteries, for the immediate commander, being the authority is jealous of his prerogative. In our service, the artillery Colonel seldom, if ever, inspects his detached batteries, nor are they allowed, except by special authority, to be absent from their garrisons of a single pound of ammunition; they are limited to a mere paper administration of regimental minutiae, and have scarcely any more influence in respect to the improvement of the artillery service than any other field officer of the five regiments. Even if any one Colonel could inspect his regiment with unity of spirit and endeavor, it could be no lasting."

It is only just to remark, however, that this subdivision of commands is equally familiar in the cavalry and infantry, where the presence of a whole regiment at any post is most exceptional, and where it is common to find the regimental headquarters established with only four or five troops or companies. But another criticism which deserves attention

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"And what has usurped its place? The infantry musket. Practice with it absorbs to-day the almost undivided attention of the artillery personnel. As a consequence, the artillery regiments for the awards as marksmen and sharpshooters have invaded its ranks and to the complete exclusion of its own legitimate practice. The artillery is in reality an infantry, with red instead of white facings on their uniforms, and are constantly employed on infantry duty. We have no longer any artillery troops. Can any one believe that the artillery would have maintained its position, were it not for its legitimate function under any other than its present divided organization? Or have we been infected with the recent excessive craze of musketry target practice, which is now so universal, and which, if continued, would have but little, if any, foothold in the artillery?"

It is a matter of grave doubt to Prof. MICHIE whether artillery officers of the higher grades will ever be able to master the special duties required of the accomplished artillerist before the time comes for them to go upon the retired list. As for the younger men, he considers them the victims of a "regimental organization which, in spite of the bright individual record of certain officers, has utterly ruined the professional pride and capacity of the majority."

"It has driven many meritorious, ambitious, and most capable young officers from the service, and has infected those that remain with an apathy and listlessness that is antagonistic to professional real, and is subversive of the high standards of the profession. It has converted an honorable profession into an indifferent calling, only bearable because it affords a semi-respectable existence in the Government."

One remedy proposed by Prof. MICHIE is to turn the artillery into a scientific corps, under the immediate command of a Chief, like that of the engineers. He notes that out of 77 graduates of the Military Academy assigned to the engineers during the twenty years since the civil war, only five have resigned, while of the 253 graduates assigned to the artillery only 151 now remain. A fifth of all have quitted the army, and about one-eighth have obtained transfers to some less indolent branch of the service. It must be left for experts in army organization and administration to determine how far Prof. MICHIE is right in his indictment of the artillery, but it is clear that the higher tier of intelligence are cultivating the more ardent they are to go to the polls.

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ARMY AND NAVY NEWS AND NOTES.

Franks Among Army Officers—Cavalry Kindling with Keenness—New Posts—Crusades and Their Causes.

WASHINGTON, March 20.—Franks in duplicating pay accounts have broken out again in the army to an extent that may surpass even the scandalous records of a few years ago, when President Arthur and Secretary Lincoln were forced to adopt vigorous measures to stamp them out. In the case of Second Lieut. Joseph S. Franks of the Signal Corps, the Pay Department has now received two distinct pay accounts for the month of February, of which four must, of course, be frauds. This officer was originally a private in the Signal Corps and a native of this city. He received his commission about seven years ago. His various dupes are wondering which of the five sets of his vouchers will be selected by the accounting officers as genuine. Lieut. J. H. G. Wilcox, Seventh Cavalry, has been arrested at St. Louis for absence from Fort Keogh without leave, and for duplicating his pay accounts. How often he performed this operation will probably appear in his trial at Fort Snelling. The interesting feature of his case is that only a few moments after Paymaster Johnson settled one of his accounts another was brought in. This caused an immediate despatch to Gen. Buger, which was in season to trace and overhaul him. The case of Franks, however, is Second Lieut. J. S. Franks, Sixth Infantry, whose duplications were discovered in the Signal Corps. The discovery of them was quite unexpected, and it is a fact that the best expert in his office is a woman, and that her services are so valuable that she has been allowed seven months' leave of absence to go to Europe.

How on earth did such a bright fellow as Garland come to be so dishonest? He is a native of this city, and was admitted to the bar in 1870. He is now the Attorney-General of an Arkansas travel agency. It was said at Fort Keogh, Kalamazoo, Kokomo, Oklahoma, or Chatham Four Corners.

Early this week a successor to Col. R. N. Scott, as chief of the War Records Office, will be sent to the War Department. The new officer is Major R. H. Hall, Twenty-second Infantry, and Col. H. M. Lazzelle, Twenty-third, have been sent to the War Department. The new officer is Major R. H. Hall, Twenty-second Infantry, and Col. H. M. Lazzelle, Twenty-third, have been sent to the War Department. The new officer is Major R. H. Hall, Twenty-second Infantry, and Col. H. M. Lazzelle, Twenty-third, have been sent to the War Department.

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LIVE TOPIC IN WASHINGTON.

WASHINGTON, March 20.—Col. Dan Lamont is wrestling with a great legal problem. In the White House mail the other day was a letter from a rural New Englander enclosing a letter which was a handsome prize. The back of the ticket bore the announcement that "no ticket will be paid unless it bears the President's signature." The President of the company is a man of the name of Lamont, but the President of the United States, and he was very urgent in asking that Mr. Lamont endorse the ticket and hurry it back to him. The President's refusal was to return the ticket with a polite little note of explanation; but, on second thought, it occurred to him that he could not do so. The President's refusal was to return the ticket with a polite little note of explanation; but, on second thought, it occurred to him that he could not do so.

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